Many Arab regimes are uncomfortable with pro-Palestine activism because, historically, both leftist and Islamist movements have used the Palestinian cause to rally opposition to authoritarian governments
Arab leaders may have often voiced support for Palestinians; their actions—rooted in self-interest, fear and geopolitical calculations—show that they are more concerned with maintaining their power and stability.
Several factors contribute to this situation.
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First, many Arab states have established strategic partnerships with Western nations, especially the United States. These alliances make governments hesitant to take strong positions against Israel, as they fear that doing so could destabilise their regimes or threaten their economic interests.
Normalisation agreements directly with Israel have also led Arab leaders to prioritise diplomacy over Palestinian rights. Egypt and Jordan, despite public discontent, maintain peace treaties with Israel, focusing on aid rather than risking diplomatic ties. Saudi Arabia has paused normalisation, contingent on recognising a Palestinian state, but this appears more strategic than a firm commitment.
Moreover, some of the Arab states have been cracking down on pro-Palestinian activism, because the authoritarian regimes, in general, are suspicious of any form of political mobilisation or popular protest, as it could challenge the state-backed narratives and policies.
Palestinian nationalism is seen as a particularly dangerous force because it symbolises a broader struggle for freedom, justice and dignity, which resonates with many Arabs and Muslims.
Historically, both leftist and Islamist movements in the Arab world have used the Palestinian cause to rally opposition to authoritarian governments. Today, this remains a key reason why many Arab regimes are uncomfortable with pro-Palestine activism.
Arab states have also been unwilling to fully integrate Palestinian refugees, fearing it would disrupt their internal political stability and create long-term demographic challenges. Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt have imposed restrictions on the rights and movements of Palestinians, with Egypt notably refusing to open its borders to Gazans fleeing Israeli bombings.
This reluctance stems from concerns that a large influx of refugees could exacerbate Egypt’s already fragile political and economic situation. Currently, Jordan hosts around 2 million Palestinian refugees, around 270,000 Palestinians live in Lebanon and Egypt already hosts around 9 million refugees from different countries.
It is also believed that Syria and Iran’s support for Palestinian factions has also been mainly for their geopolitical reasons.
The Syrian regime under Hafez al-Assad and later his son Bashar used Palestinian militias to maintain control over Lebanon but feared an independent Palestinian state would threaten Syrian interests.
Similarly, Iran’s support for Hamas is largely a strategic manoeuvre to counter Israeli and US influence rather than true ideological support for Palestinian statehood.
Iran remains Hamas’s primary ally, providing millions of dollars annually in financial, military and logistical support. This assistance, combined with its coalition with Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed militias, strengthens Hamas’s operational strength.
Despite recent escalations, including Iran’s first attack on Israeli soil in April this year and a subsequent attack earlier this month, the coalition faces challenges due to differing objectives and potential infighting among its factions.
Ultimately, Hamas and its allies’ ability to withstand Israel will depend on their cohesion, coordination against a technologically superior adversary, and managing the risks of wider escalation in the region.
